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OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Organised Civil Society: Civil society organisations that are formally established with a  
    coherent governing document and bound by the company’s code.  
    Such an organisation is required to have some degree of   
    operational formality.  
Board:    The term board is used in this study to generally refer to the  
    governing body which serves as the trustee of the public in a  
    nonprofit organisation. It connotes the council or board of directors 
    depending on the creation of the particular nonprofit.  
Sustainability:   There are several definitions of sustainability some of which are 
    very technical. The concept of sustainability is used in this study to 
    refer to the ability of an organisation to cope or adapt to changes 
    and ensure the effective use of resources to maintain its mission 








EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
Many civil society organisations (CSOs) lack governance structures and systems to support 
effective leadership transitions. Evidence indicates that a few organisations have plans in place to 
help manage leadership transition processes. This has led to a situation where organisations have 
been left in turmoil when founding executive directors leave. This report is an analysis of the 
governance structures and leadership transitions in select CSOs in Ghana. It is based on evidence 
from fieldwork carried out in Ghana involving fifteen research participants; ten of whom have 
been leaders of civil society organisations or currently serve as executive directors. The study 
explored governance structures, systems and processes within CSOs in Ghana and how leadership 
transitions and successions are managed in these organisations. The research also analysed the 
implications of succession planning for CSOs’ sustainability and proffers measures for 
strengthening governance and healthy leadership transitions. 
This study was conducted mainly through interviews, focus group discussions and field 
observations. The following are the key findings of the study: 
1. Sixty percent of executive directors and founders expressed a limited understanding of 
governance. Many of these participants tend to confuse governance roles in their 
organisations with management functions. Whilst all the organisations had governing 
bodies, many of them were not effective as a result of their initial constitution. Many of 
the governing bodies were constituted based on relations rather than professional interest 
thus, the systems that facilitate effective governance were in many cases underdeveloped.  
2. A majority of CSO leaders emphasise the importance of the governance structures of their 
organisations for effective control and accountability. However, in discussing these 
systems, they tend to emphasise their overriding importance for meeting the expectations 
of donors, with little regard for other stakeholders. Other stakeholders, including 
academics and public sector officials, reiterated the need for broader accountability 
practices that involve all stakeholders including beneficiaries and staff of CSOs. 
3. Leadership transitions are an important concern to CSO leaders, yet the study found that 
most CSOs and their boards are not proactive about dealing with the challenges of 
transitions. This is evident in organisations with long serving founding leaders.  
4. All, except for one of the CSOs studied, did not have formal succession plans in place at 
the time of the study. In a few instances, succession plans were being developed after the 
organisations had gone through the experience of a leadership transition, primarily 




5. The study also uncovered two divergent experiences of leadership transitions, one being 
smooth and the other, more challenging. Neither of the two cases followed a formal 
succession planning process. Some of the developments were largely unplanned and 


































1.1 INTRODUCTION   
Since the 1990s, there has been an evolving debate on CSOs’ governance and accountability 
around the world (Carothers, 1999, p.19; Schmitz, Raggo & Vijfeijken, 2012; WACSI, 2015). This 
has mainly been due to the growing relationship between CSOs and development aid 
programmes, international institutions as well as the accusations of corruption and inefficiency 
levelled against select CSOs (Bendell, 2006; Trivunovic, Johnsøn & Mathisen, 2011). CSOs, 
particularly Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), have often been at the forefront of 
development project implementation, which often involves large funds in the form of aid. While 
this risk is an important concern, both CSOs and international donors have not been able to 
effectively manage these risks (Trivunovic et al., 2011). However, in many of the discourses on 
accountability, the focus has been on   external accountability with very little emphasis on internal 
accountability, which often derives from effective governance structures and systems. It is this 
internal accountability which, when ensured in the governance and structural mechanisms of the 
organisation, eventually yields accountability to the people affected by the work of the CSOs, 
funders, governments and the international institutions. Researchers have underscored the need 
for CSOs to be “inwardly accountable to themselves for their organisational mission, values, and 
staff” (WACSI, 2015, p.82) even as they strive to be accountable upward to their funders, 
downward to their beneficiaries and horizontally to their peers.  
Most CSOs are still accused of not being very transparent and accountable, especially regarding 
financial resources (Schmitz et al., 2012) and internal structure due to their informal structures 
and ad hoc mode of functioning (Linnell, 2010). They often lack functional policies, structures 
and systems, which are essential to control and accountability (Linnell, 2004, p.10; WACSI, 2015, 
p.60).  
Another problem identified in CSOs is that of institutional growth. It is often difficult for these 
organisations to create independent governance systems with expert roles to help them thrive. 
Hence, many civil society groups and organisations have not been able to remain relevant and 
influential in society. While this problem is not peculiar to organisations in the non-profit sector, 
it is crucial because of their public nature.  
It is important to recognize that the policy and strategic directions of organisations, including 
policy formulation, decision making and oversight, are the responsibility of governing boards. The 
appointment of the executive director is an essential role of the governing board, which includes 
the determination of compensation and conditions of service as well as the definition of 
accountability mechanisms and performance appraisal (McKee & Driscoll, 2008). In addition, 




Even though leadership transitions present great challenges to all forms of organisations, there 
are equally good opportunities in transitions. Indeed, Allison (2002) has argued that 
organisations with an effective governing structure of a properly constituted board and following 
well designed governance processes can become stronger through leadership transitions. Many 
have described leadership transitions as challenging and complex because of the uncertain 
outcomes of the event.  
Executives in non–profit organisations are described as central to organisational operations and 
therefore overreliance on them makes organisations more susceptible to disruptions brought 
about by executive turnover (Stewart, 2016). While many reports exist of the demise of 
organisations due to executive transitions, there is also documented evidence of organisational 
qualities that buffer against turnover disruptions often found in the existence of appropriate 
governance structures, systems and processes (Stewart, 2016, p.45). In Ghana, while many 
organised civil society have significantly worked to develop long-term strategic plans; 
administrative and financial policies, with clearly defined governance roles, governance and 
leadership continues to be an important discussion of civil society sustainability.  
The discussions on CSO sustainability have been overly focused on financial sustainability. Some 
aspects of operational sustainability have been given attention (Lewis, Boateng & Hayman, 2015; 
Darkwa, Amponsah & Gyampoh, 2006), however, the critical role of governance and leadership 
has been largely absent.  
A study by the West Africa Civil Society Institute (WACSI) found that civil society sustainability 
has 4 components including financial, operational, identity and intervention sustainability (2015, 
p.13-14). Nonetheless, WACSI’s research did not emphasise leadership transition as a core aspect 
of CSO sustainability. In a related study, Kreutzer (2009) explored non-profit governance during 
organisational transitions in select Swiss voluntary associations. This study however was focused 
on organisational transitions other than leadership transitions. 
There have been a few studies in which the problem of boards and executive transitions have been 
given attention (see eg: Allison, 2002; Chapman & Vogelsang, 2005; Mckee & Driscoll, 2008; 
Froelich, Mckee & Rathge, 2011; Stewart, 2016). Many of these have however been carried out in 
Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and other European nations, all of which have 
different legislative and geopolitical contexts compared to Ghana. Some of these existing studies 
have also been approached in ways conceptually different from this paper.  While Stewart’s (2016) 
study particularly gives some insight into executive turnover in the non-profit sector, 
methodologically, Stewart’s focus on current executives who have experienced recent turnover 




While the subject of CSO internal structuring, leadership and executive transitions has gained 
great attention among practitioners around the world, not much exists in terms of research on the 
subject in West Africa and Ghana in particular. There is therefore a dearth of data on CSOs’ 
governance and leadership, especially with respect to successions in these organisations in Ghana.  
There are several reasons why the context of Ghana is important in this study. In the developed 
world, where much of the earlier studies were conducted as has been noted, there are initiatives 
of self- appointed watchdogs within the nonprofit sector (Gordon, Knock & Neely, 2009; Sloan, 
2009) which exert some level of influence on the functioning of CSOs. These aside, there are 
external and independent efforts to hold all registered nonprofit organisations accountable in 
those jurisdictions (Schmitz et al., 2012) which is a rare commodity in Ghana. Even though many 
of these external independent control mechanisms have been criticized as ensuring upward 
accountability at the expense of internal and lateral accountability (Ebrahim, 2005, p. 18), their 
existence have yielded some effective governance systems and structures over the years.1  
Also, the discussion of civil society sustainability in developing countries like Ghana is taking 
centre stage in the face of dwindling international donor funding. One unquestionable fact is that 
most CSOs in the developing world have largely depended on grants from the international donor 
community.  This has been the dominant model especially in Africa. However, there is evidence 
to the effect that this funding option is fast changing. In line with this change, there is a renewed 
interest in how to get beneficiary communities involved in keeping civic activity alive in these 
countries. This was at least clear in the presentations of the key note address and of many panelists 
at the 4th ISTR Africa Network conference held in Accra in June 2017. In countries like Ghana, the 
graduation from lower income to middle income status has resulted in some curtailment of 
previous international aid programmes to the country. Indeed, as Pratt (2016, p. 527) notes, 
“some donors have a legal obligation not to provide funds in middle-income countries”.  
The above situation pushes discourse on civil society sustainability to the table and raises 
concerns about internal, lateral and downward accountability for a thriving third sector. These 
are governance roles and responsibilities and therefore having a baseline data on the state of CSO 
governance and leadership as factors of sustainability in Ghana serves to illuminate our 
understanding of governance and especially leadership transitions. The present study was 
therefore an attempt to explore the governance structures of organised civil society in Ghana and 
their effectiveness in managing leadership transitions. It evaluates the governance systems of 
selected organisations and how executive transitions are managed in them. The study’s focus on 
                                                          




sustainability also draws attention to governance and leadership as key components of CSO 
sustainability, thereby satisfying some conceptual and theoretical gaps in the existing literature.  
 
1.1.2 The Concept of Governance 
The term governance has a Latin origin which means to steer or give direction (Cornforth, 2012, 
p.8).  Gill (2001) defines governance as “the processes, structures, and organisational traditions 
that determine how power is exercised, how stakeholders have their say, how decisions are taken 
and how decision makers are held accountable” (2001, p.1 emphasis added).  Similarly, Cornforth 
(2004) defines organisational governance as “the systems and processes concerned with ensuring 
the overall direction, control and accountability of an organisation” (Cornforth, 2012, p.8).  
The process is also described by Hughes (2010) to mean making collective decisions about 
important issues, including the purpose of collective action, strategies for achieving purpose, and 
oversight and accountability mechanisms” (2010). While acknowledging that governance could 
take place at several levels, the present focus is on governance at the organisational level.  
Governance structure is taken from the perspective of Gill to mean a distinctive set or cluster of 
‘systems’, responsibilities (functions) and processes (practices) that are logically consistent with 
one another (Gill, 2001, p.10). From this perspective, structures and systems are applied 
interchangeably in the present study based on their logical consistency and not to argue that the 
two are [always] one and the same.   
The body with the main responsibility to carry out the governance functions of an organisation is 
the board or whatever the governing body of the organisation may be. That said, the governance 
system goes beyond just the board to include the general framework of responsibilities within 
which an organisation operates. This is defined to include the regulatory, audit and reporting 
requirements and relations with stakeholders of the organisation.  It also includes other actors 
within the organisation who contribute in various capacities towards carrying out the governance 
functions (Cornforth, 2012, p.9). These actors may include managers, staff, members and other 











2.1 THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL UNDERPINNINGS 
The argument of this study is that CSO sustainability has everything to do with governance and 
leadership. The study is therefore within the framework of civil society sustainability as well as 
Mace’s managerial hegemony theory (Mace, 1971). There are four key dimensions of CSO 
sustainability under which some fifteen indicators can be discussed.2 The dimensions include 
financial, interventions, identity and operational sustainability. The present study focuses on the 
operational and identity dimensions of sustainability (Vandyck, 2017). While Vandyck presents a 
more holistic view of sustainability to include some global factors, the importance of internal 
structuring (what is termed controllable factors) for CSO sustainability cannot be 
overemphasised. The study therefore concentrates on governance and leadership structure, 
legitimacy and accountability systems as factors of sustainability.  
As a complementing theory, Mace’s managerial hegemony3 theory throws more light on 
governance and leadership as key factors of sustainability. The theory holds that due mainly to 
the voluntary nature of CSOs governing boards and the subsequent constraint on the time of 
board members, the power of CSO boards are practically limited thereby ceding control to 
managing directors and their staff (Kreutzer, 2009, p. 119). This situation according to the theory 
consequently renders governing boards symbolic and makes their roles those of “rubber stamps”. 
The present study argues among other things that this hegemony threatens the sustainability of 









                                                          
2  WACSI (2015) gives some details on these indicators among other discussions on sustainability. 
3 The concept of hegemony dates back to the works of the Hegelian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci. It was Gramsci’s 
central concept which reflects his Hegelianism (See Ritzer, 2008, p. 139-144). Gramsci defines hegemony as a cultural 
leadership exercised by the ruling class. His concept of hegemony contrasts the coercion as “exercised by legislative 
and executive powers, or expressed through police interventions” (Gramsci, 1932/1975, p.235). Unlike Gramsci’s 
application of the concept to capitalism, Mace uses it to explain institutional governance or leadership. In its original 
application, Gramsci used it to explain how some intellectuals working on behalf of the capitalists, achieved cultural 




3.1 RESEARCH CONTEXT, SCOPE AND LIMITATION 
There are two broad categories of civil society in Ghana. They include the loose groups termed the 
“organic” mostly driven by interests and urgency and the “organised” civil society with formalised 
operational structures and systems (Vandyck, 2017). The organic groups are not the interest of 
the present study because the study explores governance systems and structures which are mostly 
absent in the organic types of civil society. This focuses on the organised civil society with 
emphasis on their governance systems and leadership transitions.  
While there exist many definitions of what organised civil society is, the structural and operational 
definition given by Salamon and Anheier (1992) and cited by Lewis (2001, p.37), highlights many 
of the key characteristics exhibited by many CSOs. These characteristics include volunteerism, 
independence, organisation and non-profit distribution. It is generally expected that the 
organisations which make up organised civil society should have a degree of formality. Some 
argue that these organisations must be formally established with a coherent governing document, 
display transparency and generally conduct themselves in a manner that is ‘consistent with high 
standards of management’ (Garton, 2009). It is this kind of organisation that helps us distinguish 
organised civil society from acts of altruism often undertaken by individuals on a less formal basis. 
As emphasised by Garton (2009), it is “desirable that CSOs are not merely organised but 
organised according to principles of sound management” (2009, p.37). Some recommend an 
‘adequate governing structure’, whilst others talk about ‘organisational integrity’ when we speak 
of properly organised civil society which is distinguishable from the informal sector.  
In line with the interest of this study (exploring the governance and leadership structures of CSOs 
and how transitions of leaders are managed in them), organisations with some level of formality 
are selected. The minimum selection criteria therefore were that an organisation must have first 
and foremost been formally registered with some level of operational structure. The selection of 
the sample organisations was purely purposive. It was limited to certain organisations selected 
either based on their experiences with leadership transitions, size or the length of stay of their 
founding leaders in office. Beyond these organisations, an attempt was made to have the 
perspective of some other experts and practitioners knowledgeable on the subject matter. The 
researcher admits that this selection is limited thereby making the sample non-representative of 
the vast population of the civil society sector. While aware of the limitation of generalisation with 
this approach, respondent representativeness is not the main interest of the study considering its 






4.1 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
This study employed a purely qualitative approach. The researcher’s wish was to select a 
manageable number of organisations and their leaders for a comprehensive appreciation of the 
research problem. The case study and cross-sectional designs were believed to be the most 
appropriate designs to guide the research in terms of its context –specific focus (Blaikie, 2010) in 
getting detailed information regarding the governance and leadership of specific organisation 
types.  
In terms of sampling, the study selected some key civil society organisations for in-depth analysis 
of their governance structures, processes and approach to managing leadership transitions. It 
therefore focused on a population of CSO leaders, members, and experts (including academics, 
media practitioners and some political actors) in Ghana. In the selection of key informants, only 
top and middle level personnel of CSOs were considered for the study. The thinking was that 
having worked in the civil society space in privileged positions, leaders of these organisations 
would possess in-depth knowledge on the subject matter. The study sampled 15 participants for 
the key informant and expert interviews, and 9 participants for a focus group discussion (FGD) 
session. Considering its qualitative approach, respondent representativeness was not prioritised 
in this research. In line with this, it used non- probability sampling strategies in reaching these 
participants. It employed purposive and snowball techniques in the selection of the key 
informants, experts and focus group discussants.  
For a detailed understanding of the subject matter, the study employed a multiple of qualitative 
methods in the gathering of its primary information. It employed interviews, observation and 
Focus Group Discussions (FGD). Interview guides were developed to conduct key informant and 
expert interviews on CSOs’ governance and leadership transitions. FGD guide was also developed 
to guide the conduct of the focus group on some themes of the research. Aside these methods, the 
researcher embarked on some field visits to the selected organisations to observe the work 
environment and how these organisations run either prior to the interviews or after. Some official 
documents were also perused during this stage of the study. 
The data from the field were transcribed and organised into themes for easy appreciation and 
analysis. As usual with most qualitative research, a huge amount of data was generated; some of 
which were not very useful in the present study. Data reduction was therefore done to determine 
which part of the data is meaningful and significant in the context of the present study. During 
this exercise, the raw data was transformed into simplified data formats that could be well 




The data analysis was done using content and thematic analysis. Emerging themes were identified 
in the data and examined for their patterns and how their interpretations fit into the general 
framework of the problem of study. The analysis of the data began during the data collection stage 
to help organise the emerging themes for examination as they appeared in the subsequent data. 
The patterns or common themes that emerged in the text of the data were examined to see how 
they shed light on the research objectives. Patterns and relationships observed within and across 
groups were presented and discussed. Where deviations existed, factors responsible for those 
atypical responses were examined and presented as well.  
 
4.2 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
There is the need for researchers to anticipate the ethical issues that may arise during their studies 
and address them (Blaikie, 2010). The basic ethical principles of research were adhered to in the 
planning, execution and report of this research. Participants’ rights to decision and protection 
from harm were safeguarded under the project. First, the central intent and purpose of this study 
was well communicated to the participants before securing their consent to participate in both the 
interview and FGDs, and before tape recorders were used. Respondent confidentiality and 
anonymity is protected as well. No information given was or will be released to any third party. 
Also, names and positions of respondents and their organisations are excluded from the text of 
this report and its discussion. In cases where names are necessary for impact, pseudo names have 














5.1 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Acknowledging the limitations of the findings at this stage is important. The study primarily used 
interviews, focus group and a few observations. This prevents the effective use of multiple data 
sources for triangulation. These methods were however deliberate considering the exploratory 
nature of the research. The researcher was well aware of the sensitivity of the subject of leadership 
transitions within CSOs in the Ghanaian context. While admitting the inability to carry out proper 
data triangulation, the deliberate diversity of the respondent selection for the interviews offers 
some great validity for the findings.  
One can admit that selecting respondents purposively and by snowballing does not constitute an 
exhaustive scope of perspectives on the subject. However, interviewing 15 different respondents 
ranging from practitioners to academics of different institutional backgrounds, gave the study 
multiple perspectives of agreements and disagreements on the subject. The wide and varied 
selection of the respondents was an effort to enhance validity and also reduce biases. The case 
being researched into required identifying participants who can provide information about the 
subject and the context within which it is being analysed. So, while the actors within the civil 
society space are numerous, there are still people who are key and deemed better informed on the 
subject of the present study. In its present form however, the findings have limits of 
generalisability but provides a unique baseline for further enquiry and even more case studies.  
Following the 12th interview, the data gathered begun to show some redundancy in several 
respects indicating data saturation. The remaining three interviews were however done because 
howbeit little, the researcher thought they will bring some varied insights. To further increase the 
validity of the interviews and observational notes, some of the participants were given the 
opportunity to validate the accuracy of the verbatims after the transcriptions were done. The FGD 
was also in some sense an attempt to confirm, corroborate or dispute participant information put 
out during the interviews. It is important to state that meaning in this study is jointly constructed. 
What is presented here is therefore a joint interpretation of both the interviewer and the 
interviewee of what the meaning of a particular context is.  
 
5.2 GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND SYSTEMS IN CSOs  
Governance and executive leadership are probably the two most critical components that explain 
the success or otherwise of nonprofit organisations (Carothers 1999; Froelich, Mckee & Rathge, 
2011). This is essentially because non-governmental organisations are not exactly subject to the 
rigorous regimes that other state agencies are subject to. Therefore, CSOs are by themselves 




(Trivunovic, 2011). It becomes imperative therefore for CSOs to have governance structures and 
systems that specify accountability, internal conflict of interest rules, clear operational policies 
and financial management systems that are in line with good practice.  
For there to be a thriving third sector, the governing processes of CSOs must be clear to include 
the basic responsibilities and powers of their respective governance organs and operational 
structures, membership rules and terms of office (length of term and limits on re-elections) and 
other decision-making procedures. One could speak of conflict of interest provisions for both the 
board and management, as well as board member remunerations. Other considerations include 
board competencies which could cover a review of the CEO or ED’s performance, review of 
financial management performance, responsibility in the recruitment of CEO and the 
management of executive transitions among others. It has been argued and rightly so that a review 
of the soundness of the governance structures of CSOs in terms of their adherence to these 
indicators is what differentiates them from profit making and private enterprises.  
The other concern (mostly driven by donors) is the existence of sound financial management 
systems. This is demonstrated in the existence of basic accounting practices, financial reporting 
and record-keeping, audit practices and fraud prevention practices among others.  
It is important that the policy formulation and guidance role of governing boards be understood 
and separated from the purpose of management. Management and governance should not be 
confused with one another. These are and should be separate functions (Howe, 1995). From 
Carver’s (1990) policy governance model, the board is always in the driver’s seat while recognising 
the key roles of management in attaining the goals of the organisation. The model proposes a 
system that allows the board to deal with policy without meddling in the operation or 
programming of the organisation. The board is supposed to give strategic direction while the 
management led by the chief executive concentrates on the implementation of the strategy. 
The present study had as one of its objectives to explore the governance structures and systems 
existing in the selected organisations. The finding with respect to this shows that all the 
organisations studied – small and big, theoretically had governance structures and in some cases 
systems in place. This is however not so because these structures were in all cases established true 
to the real purpose they serve. They are required in registering these organisations. For some of 
the CSOs therefore, these structures and systems only exist on paper. Its theoretical existence also 
aids in the sourcing of funds and reporting to donors but were not operational in practice.   
Within the civil society sector, internal accountability mechanisms are institutionalised through 
an effective governance structure. There are a set of standards within civil society that are agreed 




jurisdictions, these standards exist as self-regulatory mechanisms. These self–regulatory 
mechanisms may include a clear governance structure in terms of the role of the principal 
governing body (in this case, the Board or Executive council) with clear separation from the 
management.  
Regarding these governance structures, while all the organisations had governing bodies, many 
of them were not effective. The ineffectiveness of many of the governing bodies who are the 
trustees of the public was found to originate from their initial constitution. The dominant 
situation in most small organisations sampled as regards governance structures is epitomized in 
the following response given by one executive director of an NGO in a telephone interview when 
he was asked about how the present governing board of his organisation was constituted: 
“…it was something of a flash, like we had not actually talked so much about what even 
goes into constituting a board, ok, so we just came up with some people that we thought 
had much interest in what we did and, who also have the skill and then the knowledge in 
the field. So basically, that has been it. We looked out for people with integrity; some level 
of pedigree and also very much educated” (Interview with Barnes on August 3, 2017). 
Clearly, in the above quote, the foundation is weak. It was the case in many of the NGOs. Many of 
the participants admitted that the governance structures and systems in their organisations were 
not really thought through and therefore the accompanying processes become deficient.  
A majority of the CSO leaders emphasised the importance of their governance structures for 
effective control and accountability. Quite curiously however, in discussing these systems, they 
tend to emphasise their overriding importance for meeting the expectations of donors rather than 
ensuring internal control and good governance practices. Academics and politicians on the other 
hand noted strongly the need for broader accountability practices that involve all stakeholders 
including beneficiaries, staff and members of the CSOs themselves.  
In the present study, we found that there were no proper financial control mechanisms in place 
in smaller CSOs allowing for arbitrary use of financial resources by founders, executive directors 
and other members of the organisations. For some of these organisations, they simply could not 
afford these financial and accounting systems and the personnel that come with it.  
Another observation was that in cases where there were long-serving executive directors or 
founders, it so happens that so many people within the organisation report directly to them. This 
renders the need for structures useless. In most cases, the founder possessed much of the 
knowledge base and institutional memory of the organisation. This situation further limits the 
opportunity for other members and staff of the organisation to develop their own leadership 




succession plans absent in most of the CSOs studied but also, there are no effective structures and 
systems in place to sustain the organisations if their current leadership leaves. The governing 
boards which would be saddled with the responsibility of managing the leadership transition if it 
happens are either “non-existent” or ineffective.  
In sum, many of the structures, systems and procedures in most of the organisations remain 
undeveloped. In effect, there are no safety nets in place and therefore in the event of a sudden 
departure of the leader or founder, these organisations will indeed be hamstrung. Some executive 
directors of these non-profits hold close to their chests all the key information regarding the 
organisation, key documents on contracts, accounts and investment details and even computer 
passwords in some cases. These organisations may be functioning and vibrant alright but may 
cease to operate by the mere absence of the founder or leader. Some share comments to the effect 
that the organisation is their “baby”, their “idea”, their “vision” for which reason they are best 
suited to nurture it.  
The study can speak of two different kinds of boards. The first is so busy, uninterested and 
uninvolved from the perspective of the respondents. The other extreme is the overly involved and 
meddling board. While the first presents a challenge of producing a hegemonic management who 
together with staff clothes itself with the powers of the board, the second situation of board 
governance also breeds conflicts between the management and staff and the board. In the latter, 
the boards according to the respondents meddled in the day to day management of the 
organisation and therefore had clashes with executive directors and in some cases, staff of the 
organisation over how certain processes should run. In one such case encountered in this study, 
the situation ignited a feud between the executive director and the board chairman which 
eventually led to the premature departure of the executive director. It is important to note 
however that while the earlier case of board behaviour exists in most of the organisations 
observed, the latter is a rare case. It appears the likelihood of conflicts between boards and the 
executive leadership are common only in networks and membership –based organisations as 
compared to individual organisations. The reason is obvious. In many of the individual 
organisations, the board is often appointed by the executive director or founding leader and 
therefore everything is according to the whims and caprices of this leader.   
One important deduction that can be made from the findings is that one of the key reasons for 
which CSO leaders enjoy weak governing boards is for flexibility. They want to be able to change 
their focus wherever and whenever they find needful. This partly accounts for the demand for a 
regulatory framework for the non-profit sector, with a tight requirement for CSOs being to remain 




mission, it has to go back to the registration authority and change it. You cannot be a governance 
NGO then when you see free maize coming from USA for distribution, immediately you start 
distributing maize. Unfortunately, however, this is the common behaviour of some of the 
nongovernmental organisations studied. They are project dependent and so their focus changes 
according to the wind of aid flow. Such organisations and their leaders are not fans of effective 
governing boards and processes.  
In some of the big national organisations, sound governance structures and systems were found 
to exist but not in the smaller organisations. According to leaders of the smaller NGOs, they do 
not have the financial resources to support these governance systems even though they recognise 
their importance.  As the findings show, leaders and especially founding managers get used to 
having absolute control and doing things their way. They usually want to continue to hire and fire 
staff at will and control access to financial accounts which good governance structures will not 
permit. One can argue based on the same field interviews and focus group discussions that this 
largely accounts for the lack of governance structures and systems in many of these organisations 
other than the lack of capacity as is argued by some practitioners. 
The need or desire for structures and systems usually per the observations in this research and 
some interviews create challenges within the organisations especially between passionate old 
members and staff and new comers who in most cases are less fiercely passionate. Some executive 
directors especially founding directors do not understand why one should question their 
organisational structures and the loosely defined roles of actors when that is what in their view 
has always worked for the organisation. This seeming little disagreements can launch the 
organisation into what Linnell (2004) calls “all-out battles between the champions of mission and 
the champions of systems” (2004, p.10). There are the founder –type personalities who bully staff 
and members under the guise of the mission or cause of the organisation or movement. This was 
also observed particularly in two of the organisations during the field visits. Sometimes these 
leaders felt that what they demand is politically right or even that their way is always the right 
way. Some of these leadership attitudes were even noticeable through careful observation without 
asking questions.  
Good and effective governance in CSOs is important for two key reasons: (i) CSOs use public funds 
– whether internally or external, [it is still from some public]; and (ii) they are intended as 
organisations to influence public business. Considering their important roles in society, the weak 
internal governance and accountability of CSOs whether real or perceived, is an important 
problem worthy of attention (Moore & Stewart, 1998). This problem goes to the core of CSO 




accountability to foreign donors) as an excuse to control and harass CSOs. Many CSOs are said to 
set themselves up as experts or specialists on problems that are defined by themselves. They are 
accused of living almost entirely on foreign funds and could therefore do whatever they please 
provided they find a way to make their funders happy. While this may not be a true representation 
of CSOs in Ghana, the absence of effective governing bodies (who are the trustees of the public), 
tends to give credence to these accusations. 
Even though non-profit organisations are mostly non-governmental, they are public entities just 
like government and its agencies. Their effective management is therefore essential. As public 
entities, they are expected to be accountable or bear some responsibility towards stakeholders of 
public funds, private donors, members and staff. CSOs in Ghana have often demanded for good 
governance from political/ state actors in the public sector. While calling governments to order, 
many of these CSOs often downplay the importance of the effectiveness of their own institutional 
governance and accountability. How individual organisations are run internally affects their 
credibility, effectiveness and viability as organisations and this cannot be overemphasised.  
Unlike other jurisdictions where there is proper supervision and higher expectations of public 
accountability, CSOs in Ghana have not been that responsible and accountable even to the state 
and its people. Speaking to practitioners in the present study, the dominant argument is that they 
[CSOs] do not benefit directly from state funds. Assuming without admitting that this argument 
is so, these practitioners often forget however that CSOs unlike the private sector are public 
organisations from which high accountability and corporate responsibility is expected whether or 
not their funding source is the state. Besides, it is based on their public nature/ interest that 
certain privileges and exemptions are granted them by the state. 
It appears in some of the organisations in this study that the board, which should be policy and 
value –oriented to lead, is often spoon fed by the executive director or management. Their 
activities in some cases can at best be described as reactive. Some of the major CSOs visited had 
systems and processes that they stick to, but the smaller organisations had boards who only met 
(if they ever meet) to deal with issues that arise. These boards are brought together especially 
where a funding opportunity requires the board to meet. “We sometimes get the board to meet so 
that we can get minutes of these meetings to apply for one project or another”. This was the 
response of Jack, one of the respondents in an interview in his office in July 2017 when probed 
about the infrequent nature of their board meetings. It is worth noting here that governing boards 
do not exist in nature. They are organisational creations and therefore they are only what they are 
created to be. Therefore, a board put together for registration and causes like the above, cannot 




The nonexistence of proper governance structures and systems is also largely because some non-
profit boards happen to be competent, yet busy individuals brought together to support the 
organisation with their reputation without any clear design of what their role should be. Consider 
the following response from a focus group discussant on the effectiveness of the board of her 
organisation: 
“…because we have to make sure that we are adhering to the law, the yearly [requirement] 
you know; making sure that they look at the accounts and sign off and that kind of thing, 
audit and stuff, it’s done. Beyond that, then the challenge begins. Meetings set up, it 
doesn’t come on; somebody is gone here, ok let’s have [an online] meeting... you know 
what I mean. Various challenges, but they do try to meet. So, it’s the effectiveness of it 
that’s the problem” (Williamson, August 17, 2017).  
Both small and well established CSOs face the challenge described above.  
Indeed, many of the governance deficits uncovered in this research can be blamed on 3 main 
factors: 
1. The lack of understanding on the part of board members of their place in the organisation; 
2. The composition of the board usually to include friends and family relations; 
3. The lack of clear distinction between the role of the board and that of management in these 
organisations.  
When these three are present, what we find is a passive listenership of boards to management 
reports and sometimes a possession with budgets of foreign travels of their staff and management. 
In many cases, because of their busy schedules, everything that is put out by the board is only 
what the management and staff have produced for them to “approve”. As has been mentioned, 
these boards are either busy or overly engrossed in the trivial matters of the organisations. As 
Carver (2006) notes, most of these challenges of boards and their governance do apply to most if 
not all nonprofit boards. Most nonprofit boards like public boards, fail to do what needs to be 
done for a strategic leadership of their organisation. Unlike other sectors, executives of nonprofits 
instead of being concerned about the ineffectiveness of their boards rather enjoy the weak boards 
because of the hegemonic situation the weakness creates.  
One thing that has not been contested anywhere in the nonprofit literature is the fact that 
generally, CSO founders are special beings. They are visionary, risk-taking, no-barriers and 
courageous human beings (Linnell, 2004). They will go where governments and private 
businessmen will not. They have the special ability to take a cause and turn it into a mission and 
rally people around this great mission. They are creators of a sort. Quite often however, these 




structures; and even where these structures exist, they deliberately impede their proper 
functioning. 
It has often been said that political patronage in Africa and patronage appointments results in the 
weakening of essential public service institutions. What is often seen in these institutions is loyalty 
to ruling governments as against institutional integrity. This could sometimes create mistrust 
between these institutions and their stakeholders including their beneficiaries. Paradoxically, this 
picture is no different from that which is found within sections of the civil society sector – [a sector 
which should otherwise be the torch bearer in society showing the way to govern right from the 
institutional level to the national level].  As this study confirms, the lack of structures and systems 
to ensure internal control and accountability is sometimes not because these systems were 
implemented and are lacking effectiveness but rather these initiatives never get to see the light of 
day. They meet stiff opposition. Where they are accepted and instituted too, they are done in a 
tokenistic way to have no effect. Why? These structural weaknesses serve the interests of their 
perpetrators.  
5.3 LEADERSHIP TRANSITIONS AND SUCCESSION PLANNING  
Leadership, and executive transitions is a process that is often challenging to all organisations. 
This is essentially because when judged wrongly, even the basic decision to hire a successor from 
within or without alone could throw an organisation into turmoil. Consistent with existing 
nonprofit management literature, the present study did not find organisations ready for executive 
successions. There is some stability in most of the organisations in the sector because a lot of the 
top leadership has remained stable for many years. Only a few of the organisations had 
experienced some leadership transition or succession at the level of chief executive.4 In most 
cases, these organisations were still under the charge of their founders as chief executives. While 
acknowledging generally that succession planning does have positives for organisations, many 
CSOs according to the present data have no such plans.   
Respondents in this study expressed conflicting opinions about, executive heads, boards and fixed 
terms. While some practitioners are of the view that changing boards’ composition for example 
holds some tangible benefits for nonprofit organisations, others thought that NGOs are special 
organisations and should therefore be allowed as they wish. One senior manager advanced the 
latter view so strongly during the focus group discussion: 
                                                          





“I really don’t have a problem with board members staying on for life. I said earlier on, I 
think that non-governmental organisations are a special breed whether we like it or not. 
It’s a business really but it’s a special kind of business. People who start a certain course, 
have a certain vision, a certain passion, a certain drive around it and I decide that…” (A 
position expressed by Asaase, August 4, 2017) 
Even though this is a minority view, some executive directors interviewed shared similar views. 
In their view, NGOs are special businesses and should not be compelled into having systems and 
practices of corporate entities and public institutions. For some of these CSO leaders, they find it 
therefore absurd that people are discussing the long terms of executive directors and founders in 
the nonprofit sector as though it were any special problem. What appears contradictory however 
is that the same leaders cite cases of founders who lead their private /family organisations until 
they die to justify the above position.  
“You know, one of the things that came up that I want to comment on was the fact that 
founders or members of this institution want to be part of the management or board; there 
is nothing wrong with those things. The law allows it and a company can have two 
shareholders and the two of them are the only board members. There is nothing wrong 
with it... It’s a private company and what makes you think the NGO or the CSO is not a 
private company. Where he sits, he started this venture because he had such a passion for 
it and he started it. Ok so let’s call you a shareholder in the normal circumstances of it, 
that’s a member, the owner, why do you want to force him out of the management of the 
organisation? Simply because he is the owner, somebody else should be doing the 
management? He’s the owner; in him is the best vision and drive for his company” (Mrs. 
McCarthy, August 16, 2017). 
One can sense the passion in the above quote. What is fascinating in all of these is that in one 
instance CSO leaders are quick to justify their arguments with what happens in private and family 
businesses and in another breath, argue that the nonprofit is a special breed not to be compared 
with business corporate and the government. 
While acknowledging that the departure and replacement of executive directors is a crucial task, 
the study found that there are no proactive steps toward smooth executive transitions in many of 
the organisations. This is even much pronounced when the executive director happens to be the 
founder or co-founder of the organisation. Stating it bluntly, there are no preparations and no one 
talks about it until the leader on his /her own volition decides he/she has had enough and  wants 




solely by the founder or at his instance. They have mostly actively directed who their replacements 
should be. Mostly, at this stage, the founder is tired, sometimes old and simply wants to move on 
so not much of a mentoring is done.   
Some of these founders have some funding sources tied to their personality, influence and 
personal integrity other than that of their organisations. When this is the case, there is the need 
for the founder to introduce the successor to these funding sources and build safety nets for the 
continuous flow of these funds for the survival of the organisation in his/her absence. Sadly, this 
hardly happens because the transitions are not proactively and systematically approached in most 
organisations.  
The departure of an organisation’s most senior person is no mean activity. It could be disruptive 
and traumatic for both the leader and the organisation. It is for this reason that executive 
succession planning has attracted considerable attention from practitioners and academics. 
Succession planning is described to mean “a systematic and long-term practice that an 
organisation follows to ensure it has the necessary pool of managerial talent to enable it to meet 
its business objectives and achieve its mission” (Rothwell, 2002 in McKee & Driscoll, 2008, 
p.341).   There is a strong view in the management literature that there are tangible benefits that 
accrue from the development and implementation of succession plans (Fulmer & Conger, 2004; 
Mckee & Driscoll, 2008). Researchers in the global north consider succession planning as part of 
the strategic plans of the nonprofit sector.  
There are several definitions of succession planning without agreement. However, all these 
definitions connote some form of formal rules and procedures designed to ensure succession. 
Rothwell (2001) offers a comprehensive description of what succession planning entails. Rothwell 
defines the concept as; 
“a deliberate and systematic effort by an organisation to ensure leadership continuity in 
 key positions, retain and develop intellectual and knowledge capital for the future, and 
 encourage individual advancement” (Rothwell, 2001, p.6).  
While the very activities included in succession planning may differ, what it represents should 
never be in doubt. In the evolution of the practice of executive succession planning has emerged 
two popular approaches: “horserace” and “relay”, each of which must be approached intentionally 
and deliberately. Either one is mentored specially for it or it is open for others to takeover at the 
end of one’s term. Considering that a succession plan is a plan specially put in place to aid the 
preparation for either a long term or short-term departure of a member of an organisation, it 
could happen at every level of an organisation. This is however crucial at the level of the executive 




director transition will take place, the organisation ought to put together both an emergency 
(short-term) and long-term succession plan. This will prepare the organisation and its members 
for the short or long-term departure of the leader (Allison, 2002; Chapman & Vogelsang, 2005, 
p.3 -6). The plan is also expected to guide the organisation in ways to sustain itself during this 
process and even how to prepare for a new leadership. A succession plan should be able to be clear 
about who should take over the role of the executive director in his/her absence in the interim. It 
should also give clarity as to the process to be followed in looking for and hiring a replacement for 
the executive director in the event of a permanent departure (Chapman & Vogelsang, 2005).  
Such deliberate and well thought –out plans as described above were absent in all but one of the 
organisations studied. Where a plan exists at all, it was not detailed and therefore gave no clarity 
as to how the transition should go. It was so in many of the cases because the organisations are 
still led by their founders and co-founders. In such organisations, succession planning as an 
organisational practice becomes a taboo. Asking for a succession planning would mean an attempt 
to whisk the organisation from its founder and leader. Some of the practitioners, many of who are 
part of management in their organisation expressed dissatisfaction with lack of planning but like 
the average Ghanaian, they will not stick their neck out on it at the organisation. Here, we find the 
unquestioning acquiescence of the average Ghanaian within organisational context.  
In some of the cases encountered in this study, the founders on their own, without any clear plans 
in place decided it was time to leave and hand over to a new leadership. In all those instances, the 
decision to leave, the time to leave and who the replacement should be were handled by the 
founder-leaders. One co-founder and present executive director of his NGO admitted the lack of 
succession planning in most CSOs including his own organisation but had the following to say: 
“…so what we are talking about really is a leadership culture problem which you find even 
in the private sector. I know one of the biggest private companies in this country which is 
foreign owned. When the lead, the man who ran it for many years was leaving, it wasn’t 
hard to hand over to a successor, you see, because of the robustness of the governance 
structures. So, what I am telling you is that it’s not only the NGO sector that you find this 
problem…in every society, there’s a culture around power which you can point to which is 
quite different.  In the Ghanaian context, we have what I call a chieftaincy culture to power. 
A chieftaincy culture to power which feeds the male dominance, unaccountable behaviour, 
and assuming that you can sit in office until you are ready to go, and you should not worry 
about who comes next. And in private limited liability companies which people set up, they 
tend to collapse precisely because of this problem. And I think it’s not an NGO problem. 




attributable to the CSO sector as far as the larger social and cultural soil within which 
institutions operate because institutions are creatures of their context” (Interview with 
Mensah in Accra, August 22, 2017). 
If the above quote is anything to go by then one can say that it does agree to some extent with the   
accessibility of people to traditional leadership in Ghanaian cultures. In traditional Ghanaian 
society, leadership is ascribed and not easily accessible –it is not by achievement.  However, in 
some western coasts the title of a “chief” could be borne by anyone with the resources to engage 
in the elaborate rituals that come with the position and also sponsoring a number of community–
feasts.  Chieftaincy in Ghana is restricted to royals and their close relations (Ebow, 1993, p.35). 
The power that comes with being a chief cannot be worked for. It is interesting however to note 
that the finding relating to this discussion is not particularly contextual. The lack of succession 
planning is a challenge that has been observed in many other contexts in the nonprofit literature. 
In one such case, Froelich et al. (2011) did a survey in which succession planning of executive 
directors of charitable nonprofits and CEOs of cooperative organisations were explored. In their 
study, they found that planning and preparation in those organisations did not commensurate the 
level of concern and interest in executive successions. In the said study, while replacing long –
serving leaders is acknowledged to be a difficult task, very few organisations were found to be 
forward –looking about it.  
The other challenge that arises in this discussion is what the role of a founder or long serving 
executive director of an organisation should be (in that organisation) after his or her departure. 
While I agree that founding leaders should continue to be relevant to their organisations after 
they depart, the capacity in which they serve is important and must be decided with tact. When 
asked the ways in which founders could serve the organisation after leaving office, many of the 
respondents (founders especially) thought these gallant leaders could be of great use on the 
organisations’ board. Two of the founders who had departed from their executive positions in the 
organisations they each founded and led were serving as board members of the organisation at 
the time of the study. This in some respects presents a lot of opportunities for the organisation. 
However, its challenges are also not farfetched. While many success stories may exist of founders 
transitioning onto the boards of their organisation, there are equally damning cases. The practice 
is common in the management literature but it cannot be described as a healthy organisational 
practice that should be encouraged. One reason why this cannot be good practice is that the 
structure of nonprofit organisations is such that the board exercises some leadership and 
supervisory role over the management. Therefore, if an influential founder –leader should leave 




view, that individual never left. This is particularly so because as indicated earlier in this report, 
many of these founders are mostly either instrumental in finding their replacement by 
handpicking a successor. It is only politically correct therefore to think that such a successor 
making an entry into the executive position through the vehicle of the founder would continue to 
do the business of the founder. Where the successor acts otherwise, the result has often been the 
failure or early departure of the new hire. A similar case in the nonprofit management literature 
is that which Chapman and Vogelsang (2005) reported a decade ago.5   
There is no one size that fits all when it comes to dealing with what the role of the founder should 
be after a departure. The capacity in which an outgoing founder or executive director should serve 
an organisation is a critical decision which the governing board ought to make with a lot of 
consideration and tact. 
Despite recommendations from practitioners and some researchers during my interviews that the 
founders’ transition unto boards could serve the organisation well, I hold the guided opinion that 
a founder’s place on the board after departing from the position of an executive director is not the 
best for nonprofit organisations. There are several other capacities in which the founder can serve 
the interest of an organisation he just exited but it is obviously not the best on the board which to 
some extent exercises supervisory role over the management. 
 
5.3.1 THREATS TO EFFECTIVE EXECUTIVE TRANSITIONS  
In analysing the present findings, the question arises about what the threats to successful 
executive transitions are. This question was posed to many of the respondents in this study and 
the common responses could be grouped into four key factors. These factors include: the lack of 
effective governance structures, fear of the unknown, livelihood, power and prestige; and are 
discussed below. 
5.3.1.1 Lack of Effective Governance Structures 
The first key factor found to threaten successful executive and founder transitions in this study is 
the lack of effective governance structures in many of the organisations studied. Nonprofit 
organisations are organisations limited only by guarantee. This organisational type lacks the 
relational bonding of families and the commitment to success given by the profit motive of the 
private sector. What drives civil society and the nonprofit generally is a commitment to a vision 
                                                          
5 In Chapmann and Vogelsang (2005), a 73 year old founder during the negotiation his exit after considerable 
pressure from the board to retire, managed to secure himself a place on the board among other benefits. The 
executive director who came directly after this founder lasted only nine months in office. The second was willing 




and mission. Therefore, if a group of individuals have set themselves up as an organisation in 
pursuit of a vision, there should be a way of ensuring that there is commitment to this vision and 
this is what governing bodies do. Unlike the private business however, the nonprofits’ 
commitment to a public cause accords some public services and privileges to them requiring that 
the same public has a stake in these organisations. This is why the board is a trustee of the public. 
It holds the nonprofit company in trust of the public.  
5.3.1.2 Fear of the Unknown 
The second factor worthy of note is what has been termed here the fear of the unknown. Many of 
the founders the researcher spoke to during this study confessed of a genuine anxiety about the 
future of the organisations they have long toiled to build. They ask themselves, “what will become 
of this organisation should I decide to permanently depart from here?” They believe in the vision 
and are passionate about it and therefore feel they are the only people well placed to pursue or 
lead that vision. Indeed, some founders of these nonprofits during the interviews expressed 
genuine believe that their organisations could not succeed without them. While this is an 
acceptable human condition considering all that founders go through to establish a cause, it is the 
possible creations of this feeling that threatens the future of these organisations. It was clear in 
the data gathered that this feeling makes many of the founders hold on tight to their positions 
even when there are clear indications that their strengths and intellects could no longer offer 
anything new to the organisation.  
One mark that is missed in all of the above is that the leadership and direction of the organisation 
is the primary responsibility of the governing body and not that of the founder or management. It 
thus becomes the responsibility of the governing board or council to determine when a change is 
required for the organisation and how that transition should be handled.  
Some respondents drew attention to the fact that many of the organisations that have remained 
relevant and vibrant may have been under stable leadership. One of them was quite insistent. 
Consider the quote below: 
“If you check, the strongest CSOs in Ghana still are those that are still led by their     
founders and there are a few successful NGOs beyond their founders and they are 
struggling. They are not so stable. They are not as stable as when their founders were there. 
Check.” (Interview with Rayat in his office, 28th July, 2017).  
In relation to Rayat’s position, one can indeed point to many failed CSOs whose failure is 
attributable to the loss of their founders. This observation prompted a casual count of influential 
CSOs in Ghana and I can affirm that indeed most of the CSOs that have remained active and 




While this is worthy of further interrogation, one could argue that even the so called relevant CSOs 
could have been better under new leadership. Assuming without admitting that the fact in the 
quote applied, would that mean these founders lead better? These are pertinent issues yet to be 
addressed by any empirical observation in this part of the world. What is known however is that 
where an organisation – be it public or private, is run single –handedly by its founding manager 
without the effective participation of others, it most likely will not survive beyond the ‘lifetime’ of 
that founder. That is why it is even more important to understand the reasons behind the founder 
syndrome to find effective ways of addressing them for a thriving third sector.  
While many of the respondents thought it is about time a dispassionate discussion is made about 
the “sit tight” syndrome of CSO leaders, a section of the leaders and especially founders argued 
strongly that the call to such a discussion is misguided. One founder who doubles as executive 
director who has been in his position for over 15 years and insisted “one should not make it [look] 
like there’s some principle somewhere that requires that organisations change their leadership or 
that people leave an organisations after any period” (Interview with Yago, July 20, 2017).  
One can admit that the argument in the above quote is valid. However, one should not 
misconstrue the call for a dispassionate consideration of leadership transitions and succession 
planning to mean a call on CSO founders and executive directors to necessarily quit their jobs.  
The understanding that is required is that the departure or otherwise of a chief executive and how 
such a transition is handled is a governance function and should therefore be a policy decision. 
What is the policy of the entity as regards the tenure of its top executive office holder? Staying 
true to the mission and related policies of the organisation is what is important and consistent 
with good organisational governance. If the stated policy of the organisation is that the executive 
director could serve 30 years, this should be followed. However, such an important decision 
should not be left to any one individual’s whims and caprices.   
5.3.1.3 The Livelihood Challenge  
There is the economic angle to effective leadership transitions and the lack of it thereof. The 
decision to remain in their position as leaders of the organisations they created even amidst social 
and natural calls for change in leadership is economically driven in most cases. For many of these 
leaders, they do not foresee any other source of livelihood beyond what they do for their 
organisations. So, it becomes a question of survival rather than a genuine fear that the 
organisation may not survive in their absence as has been advanced in some cases. The financial 
incentive that makes commercial entrepreneurs move on without difficulty is almost always 
absent in the nongovernmental sector. As a social entrepreneur, when you feel like moving on, 






5.3.1.4 Power and Prestige 
This factor is hardly ever accepted by the founders themselves. Though hesitantly, some do agree 
that leading these organisations come with some power and fame depending on the size of the 
organisation. Letting go such privileged positions in society can be very difficult. It is human and 
must be understood and handled in the best way possible.  
Considering the factors mentioned above and their strength in determining human behaviour, 
one can understand why people hold on to their positions even when there are calls to give others 
the opportunity to contribute to these organisations. Too often, senior and experienced officers in 
CSOs burn out and feel frustrated because they do not foresee career progression opportunities. 
As one senior officer put it during our interview session, “I’ve been the programmes officer for 
years, so now what? Where do I go from here?” This sentiment, as simple and ordinary as it may 
appear, represents a great constituency of senior and middle level managers of the civil society 
sector. Many of the respondents at some point expressed this frustration of limited opportunity 
to advance in their career in the nonprofit sector. While the turnover intentions of respondents 
were not a focus in this study, a careful interrogation of this fact reveals it as one of the effects 
founder syndromes produce. It is important however for all who care about the success of the civil 
society sector to recognise that the career space of civil society actors is very limited and therefore 
demands a lot of thinking and effort into programming and organisational structuring and re –
engineering. Especially in our part of the world, because no one is monitoring the rate of turnover 
in nonprofit organisations, not much discussion exists on these issues. They are however 
important if the intention is to live true to our organisational missions. 
Founders’ understanding of succession planning is often limited to efforts towards planning for 
successions in the top management and therefore since they do not plan for their exit anytime 
soon, they turn to neglect its value. Meanwhile, succession planning in its true sense is much more 
expansive than that. It includes a systematic development of talents internally at all levels of the 
organisation.  
Except for one network organisation, all the selected organisations in this study had no limit on 
the tenure for the executive director. What exists at best were unlimited office tenures during 
which the governing board had the right to terminate the appointment of the executive director 
based on performance and conduct. On the face of it, this may sound great. That the board 
exercised the oversight and could ask the executive director out for poor performance sounds 




whether this has a chance of ever happening. While boards still remain the leaders of executive 
transition processes as the sole body laden with the authority to hire and fire the top management, 
it is clear that these boards (at least 80% of them in this study) are not prepared and do not have 
any well-designed processes to oversee effective leadership transitions. As could be deduced from 
many of the responses, this challenge goes back to the basics of board membership composition. 
Once this is wrong, it follows that the board will most likely be ineffective in governing the 
organisation, especially the transitions it goes through.  
In addition to the absence of a well thought through executive succession plan, most of the 
organisations in this study who had gone through executive transition did not seek the help of 
professionals in managing the process. This in part affirms the fact that organisations attached 
little seriousness to this process and therefore did not think it worthy of investment. But one thing 
is certain -in the absence of formal succession plans and professional support, the result of many 
such transitions is chaos or the quiet demise of organisations. Although some of these 
organisations are alive today, they are not effective when it comes to the pursuit of their missions.  
5.3.2 FOUNDERITIS: A CSO PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERN  
Call it founder syndrome or whatever you may – founderitis is a disease that can collapse any 
organisation once it gets a hold of the organisation. It is fondly known as founderitis but founders 
and long-serving leaders are equally susceptible to its venom. If untreated, founderitis has the 
potential to result in organisational fatalities; it could frustrate staff and other members of the 
organisation and increase turnover to unsustainable levels (Linell, 2004, p.11-14). While all 
organisations are susceptible to this ailment, the susceptibility of nonprofits is high for many 
reasons (McKee & Driscoll, 2008; Tandon, 2016b). The nonprofit sector is only limited by 
guarantee and there is no regulation as to who can or cannot serve as a trustee of the public. Also, 
the profit that drives the private entrepreneur is here absent; neither do they have the qualities 
that bind families together. The nonprofits are purely driven by a mission drawn from the vision 
which is often that of the founder(s) thereby increasing the sector’s susceptibility to founderitis.  
One point worth reiterating is that the sustainability of civil society is imperative for the survival 
of Ghana as a democratic society and indeed, this country’s history can never be well-written 
without the heroic roles of civil society and nonprofit leaders. From advocacy to service provision 
and all that comes in between, the role of civil society can in no way be overemphasised. They go 
where government and the private sector will not go. The nonprofit founder –leader is a creator 
and a genitor. However, understanding to build, maintain and transition both personally and 
organisationally are core leadership competencies that some CSO founder –leaders have proven 




excessive stability at the expense of flexibility could make an organisation static in areas that are 
not helpful. 
What is founderitis and what are the symptoms of the syndrome? The condition describes a 
situation where a founder or leader stays on too long in a leadership position to the effect that the 
continuous stay of this leader begins to serve the organisation in a dysfunctional way. The 
symptoms may include a show of absolute power and control over the organisation and its 
functioning, they lack the ability to delegate, the organisation beginning to be oriented towards 
the personality of the leader (leaders having role-bound identities), when there are indications 
that the organisation has outgrown the leader and requiring a change, yet the leader remains in 
charge (Linnell, 2004; James, 2016; Tandon, 2016a; McKee & Driscoll, 2008). They ignore the 
inputs of subject –matter experts. These leaders hardly ever want to change what has worked in 
the past even in the face of changing trends. They tend to focus much on loyalty as compared to 
good performance of the people they work with and do not value the importance of formalised 
planning. In most cases, any attempt at instituting measures that decentralise decision making is 
fought against by this leader. These symptoms are concerns that threaten the survival and 
continuity of the nonprofit sector.  
In many of the organisations visited during the 45 days of data collection, even though there 
existed organisational structures, they were mostly undeveloped. In terms of management, many 
of the staff members report directly to the executive head which is not a very good sign of 
organisational development. In most cases, other members and staff of the organisations are 
barely granted any opportunity to grow and aspire to other leadership responsibilities. Speaking 
to staff during field visits revealed that some of these workers are close to the point of burning 
out. Many of them do not find their roles exciting anymore because they claim they are very 
limited in operation and contribution. Others complain of the monotony of “writing reports, 
attending meetings they are sometimes uninterested in and responding to emails”. These 
interactions also confirmed some observations during the interview sessions. That is, a bulk of the 
knowledge base of the organisations in many cases resided with the founder –leader. He/she 
bears the institutional memory and also the understanding of what it is the organisation is doing 
and the rationale behind those projects and programmes.  
Speaking to CSO founding –leaders as a researcher gave me a sense of why the founder syndrome 
is such a big deal in the nonprofit sector. They call the idea that birthed their organisations “my 
baby” for a reason. They conceive the idea, toil so hard to birth it and watch it grow. This they 
described with a lot of passion and emotion during the interviews with founders in this study. 




the process of founder transition can be likened to “giving one’s child for adoption”. Giving your 
child for adoption while still alive can be emotionally threatening but as one founder did admit, 
“it looks like sometimes it is just the right thing to do if you wish better for the child” (Interview 
with Mr. Barnes, August 3, 2017). The question should rather be about how this all-important 
activity can be managed so it is less disruptive, less painful and healthy.   
Why is discussing and eventually dealing with founderitis in CSOs so important? The answer is 
quite simple. Unlike the private sector, CSOs are “publicly funded”. While many of the 
respondents appear to present a contrary view on this, it is a fact that cannot easily be disputed. 
Public funding is not to be understood only in terms of government funding locally. The donor 
funds on which CSOs so heavily depend for their survival are public funds. It could be sourced 
from which ever public– whether individuals or foreign governments. It is for this reason that 
founderitis may pass unnoticed in a private family –run enterprise but it is of a serious ‘public 
health’ concern in the nonprofit sector.  
The founderitis challenge can be addressed through well-developed and implemented succession 
plans.  However, as has been mentioned earlier, the present study found no formal succession 
plans in place at any of the organisations in this study. The networks had some statements or 
regulations regarding succession nebulously stated in their constitutions or foundational 
documents. The process of planning was however absent. Preparing for any transition in 
leadership is therefore left to the discretion of whoever manages the process. The result of such 
“vague plans of succession” has been chaos. The study encountered two classic cases where the 
leadership of networks failed to relinquish their positions at the expiration of their tenure. One of 
these cases is presently at the Department of Social Welfare’s NGOs office for resolution. Clearly 
therefore, the solution to founderitis is not in vague constitutional provisions per se. It is an 
exercise that requires deliberate plan and commitment.  
One can admit that founderitis is indeed a deadly organisational disease but it can be cured. 
Founders can let go. Transitions can be healthy when done more intentionally. CSO founders 
should find wisdom in learning to support the independence of their boards and the people they 
work with. It is time to realise and move away from the “dependence and compliance” model of 
board leadership to one that is appropriate in composition and prepared to use well –designed 
processes to deal with changes organisations experience.  
5.3.3 GOVERNING BOARDS AND EXECUTIVE TRANSITIONS 
In the case of a transition, one can admit the added challenges it presents which is why the role of 
the governing board is even so crucial. In a leadership/ executive transition, it is the board’s 




and trust in the organisation. This comes on the backdrop of the fact that resisting change is a 
common organisational behaviour that must be appreciated and managed appropriately. Decision 
making during a transition is so important and must be participatory to avoid inflammation of 
passions.  
As has already been acknowledged in this report, most of the organisations and their boards are 
not prepared for leadership transitions. However, considering the crucial nature of transitions, 
boards and managements will be better served by acting rather than reacting during transitions. 
Where transitions are not handled deliberately, it leads to a lot of disruptions – one of which is 
the resignation of experienced senior staff, a weakening of board relationships and ultimate 
disruption in service provision. In two of the organisations observed in this study, the lack of 
deliberate planning for executive transition resulted in some disruptions. In these organisations, 
the changes in leadership and the boards’ ill preparation resulted in key staff resignations and a 
disruption in board relationships.  
One can argue that no organisational development professional worth his sort will put together 
an interview panel to hire a new chief executive during a transition on which a senior staff who 
wished for this same position serves as secretary. As bizarre as it may sound, this was the case in 
one of the organisations I studied in this research. The resulting impact of such a blunder is 
obvious. The new executive director and this senior staff never got along. The staff subsequently 
had to resign from the position. Confirming this ill-treated transition, the same senior staff 
returned to the organisation following the retirement of the said ED. 
In other cases, the outgoing chief executive and in the worst-case scenario, founder, dominates 
the succession process without any formal plan. This clearly demonstrates Mace’s theory of 
managerial hegemony in practical terms. All governance experts agree that processes leading to 
the departure and hiring of chief executives is the responsibility of the board. It is the governing 
board that leads and directs a transition. However, in the present study, I found a common 
practice where this responsibility was consciously or otherwise ceded to the executive led by the 
outgoing leaders themselves.  In many of these cases, the board was only given the outcomes of 
these processes to approve to fulfil all righteousness.  
In the management of executive transitions that supports organisational growth, the board 
exercises the leadership role. It is a governance issue more than an executive act especially when 
it has to do with the top executive position. The process must be forward –looking and involve 
two major phases – the planning and preparation phase and the transition phase itself. In the first 
phase, there is the need to institute long term and short term/emergency succession plans. Such 




legacy. In the period leading to the planning and the transition itself, there is the need for 
organisational assessment. This includes putting together a competent team (a committee) to 
manage the process. During this assessment, efforts should be made to reaffirm the mission and 
vision of the organisation. Priorities are set for the next activity of bringing in a new chief 
executive. All of these processes must be deliberate and formal.  
The recruitment and selection of new chief executive becomes the next big thing. A job description 
is developed by the committee with expert help and the search begins whether internally or 
externally. This could then be followed by the interview and a shortlist presented to the entire 
board for consideration. After the board has made its selection, issues of benefits can then be 
determined before the hire.  
Also, in most organisations, the post hire period is left to chance but this could be dangerous since 
the period immediately following the hire is as important as the period preceding it. It requires 
planning and deliberate actions. Here, there is the need for executive director coaching and 
mentoring of a sort. The reason is that the literature has shown the top position in the nonprofit 
sector is not one that many people hold twice. So, hardly does there exists an experienced 
executive director. Studies around the world have shown that the majority of executive directors 
who experience turnover do not transition into another organisation as executive directors. 
Therefore, most fresh executive director hires are fresh hires. There is also the need to introduce 
the new chief executive to a network of peer executive group immediately after the hire. These are 
all to help the new executive in his/ her new role. 
Failure to engage in this deliberate executive coaching and mentoring could create a situation 
where the new inexperienced nonprofit chief executive looks up to senior staff for direction and 
guidance which could subsequently create ineffectiveness or conflict. Some senior staff by their 
mere guidance of the chief executive in the period immediately following their employment, 
become kingpins. In some cases, these staff later rally a constituency of workers around 
themselves and rule a section of the organisation while the chief executive controls the other.  The 
dangers of these are only obvious. It is for this and many other reasons that boards should treat 
their role in a leadership transition with utmost importance. 
 
5.4 STRENGTHENING GOVERNANCE AND LEADERSHIP TRANSITIONS 
One fundamental challenge that CSOs face at least from the perspective of their critics has been 
the lack of effective governance systems and internal democracy. This challenge can be traced to 
the regulatory framework for CSOs in Ghana. The sector is regulated in much the same way as 




guarantee. The one difference found is that CSOs do not have shares and do not make profit. The 
regime for managing their directors, removing their directors, and for appointing their directors 
is all managed by the company’s code. These nonprofit organisations operate within this strange 
amorphous milieu where all the other companies, limited by shares and for-profit companies all 
operate. It is therefore not surprising that we find the governance systems of many of these CSOs 
correspondingly compromised. Even as we call for democratic processes in CSOs, we must not 
forget that the company’s code which  also guides CSOs is not a democratic regime. 
Companies are controlled by their owners, those who own the shares but there are no shares in 
the registration of NGOs. And the next most important set of people are the directors (Companies 
Act, 1963). In Ghana, and in many other places, most directors are either related by family or 
friendship or strong business ties (McKee & Driscoll, 2008). In the case of CSOs, the directors are 
people who seem to share a certain vision. So, there is a disjoint between what binds directors in 
for-profit companies and what is supposed to bind directors in CSOs and yet they are directed by 
the same regime. Hence, the first step to ensuring effective governance of the civil society sector 
in Ghana is to reconsider the regulatory framework /regime within which these organisations 
operate. This is not to call for a gagging of CSOs by the state as is the present attempt in Nigeria.  
After several years of democratic rule, many commentators have described the strenuous 
attempts by Nigeria’s House of Representatives to set up a Federal agency to regulate the activities 
of NGOs as a blow to the civil liberties of the Nigerian people. This is because of the content of the 
Bill and what it seeks to achieve.6 What is being proposed for Ghana in the present study is to 
come out with a regime different from the company’s code which will take into consideration the 
peculiar challenges that confront the nonprofit sector. 
While civil society regulation has been fought by many practitioners, there are cases where there 
can be positive regulation. In the broadest way, regulation could mean a ‘form of behavioural 
control, whatever the origin’ (Hammann, 1987). In another context, legal for example,it could be 
used refer to ‘the realm of legislation, governance and social control’ (Ogus, 1994). In the academic 
field, regulation comes with a rather narrower definition as recognised by Garton (2009). The 
concept has often received attention from law and economics. Selznick describes it as the 
‘sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency over activities that are valued by a 
                                                          
6 The Bill specifies among other things that an Executive Secretary and a 17 member board will be appointed by 
the President to serve a five year term. This board will among others look into funds received by these NGOs and 
how they are spent. Interestingly, in this regime, an NGO cannot spend without the express approval of the 




community’ (Garton, 2009, p.4 -5). Such a sustained and focused control will be expected to 
among other things, direct or encourage behaviour which (according the present study) may not 
occur without such an intervention; and by so doing correct the real and perceived deficiencies in 
the system in meeting the collective or public interest goals (Hansmann, 1987; Garton, 2009).  
As has been mentioned earlier in this report, the researcher is well aware of the successes of self-
regulation in other jurisdictions. That notwithstanding, the kind of regulation suggested in this 
study will serve to streamline the structure and governance of organised civil society. This is 
expected to correct the existing deficiencies of the sector towards the maximization of the sector’s 
benefits to society. 
 
This study therefore calls for a shift of nonprofit organisations from the company’s code towards 
the establishment of a different regime for their governance. In that regime, certain things can be 
determined there. First and most important is the caliber of people who should sit on the 
governing boards. Every nonprofit must have a governing board and provide for the caliber of 
people who can sit on that board. Second, provide for their functions, their responsibilities and 
then their benefits. Then establish that every NGO must have an executive agent – however the 
organisation chooses to call the person. The occupant of this office should be appointed by the 
board who sees to the management of the affairs. Then every NGO must have its vision and 
mission spelt out and it must stay true to its mission. In this scheme, there must be a deliberate 
attempt to reduce the powers of the executive and the leadership role of the board emphasised. 
There are many responsibilities of the boards of nonprofit organisations. Key among these is the 
selection of an executive director or CEO as the case may be. This has so been proven over the 
years because even though it seldom happens, whenever it happens that a new executive director 
is to be selected, it becomes number one on the board’s agenda. This is partly informed by the 
available evidence of the outcomes of poor hires in the sector (Golensky, 2005, p.9). The process 
of selecting a chief executive is so important and must remain on the front burner of every 
nonprofit governing board. Where need be, professional help should be sought. However, one 
other strategy affirmed in the nonprofit literature is the setting up of a small committee of a cross 
section of board members (Weisman & Goldbaum, 2004; Golensky, 2005). This small committee 
oversees the process until the point where selection is to be made of the new executive director. It 
is at this point that the full strength of the board is brought to bear on the hiring process. This is 
also important because if a hire is to be made at this point, then the benefits of the position must 





Allison in his work shared the experience of the Presbyterian Church of Northern California which 
had in place a formal pastor transition programme. What is interesting about this example is the 
church’s view of transition as a window of opportunity for renewal and its unique way of 
supporting transitions with skilled interim leadership. The church unlike many of the 
organisations in this study understood transition as a long-term process as opposed to change 
which usually is external to individuals and organisations (Bridge, 1991).7 According to Allison, 
the Presbyterian church “treats leadership transition as a naturally occurring event in the life of a 
congregation [rather than an unanticipated crisis to be avoided]” (Allison, 2002, p.343). It is this 
realisation that led the church to adopt a national transition programme aimed at supporting 
congregations that undergo transition. In the present study as has been mentioned already, 
nothing of the sort really exists in the CSOs. It is a discussion that is not happening. At least, not 
constructively. In the case of the church’s example, a cadre of interim pastors are usually trained 
and readied for temporal leadership and guidance in procuring a new pastor while the 
congregation is allowed the space of up to a year to reflect on its goals and the kind of leadership 
it will appreciate in the next pastor. While this cannot be practiced by all organisations, the 
philosophy is great and the model can be amended and followed in many nonprofit organisations.  
For there to be effective executive and most importantly founder transitions, founders and long 
serving executives must themselves appreciate the need to transit and the dividends of doing it 
right. It is about time founders especially recognised that sometimes all their organisations need 
is a leadership transition if it is to be a sustainable organisation.  
Boards of CSOs must embrace their role as custodians of nonprofits and rise to the occasion when 
their role is most required. As has been emphasised in this research report, managing an executive 
transition is a board function and so boards of nongovernmental entities must be seen playing 
their functional role. Exercising institutional leadership for an organisation going through 
changes is the best any board can do for its organisation. This again has a lot to do with the 
constitution of the governing boards. Organisations should by themselves eschew the habit of 
assembling friends and family when constituting their boards. The purpose and key roles of board 
members must also be clearly spelt out to them. As has been emphasised time and again, boards 
do not exist in nature, we create them and they only become what we create them to be.  
 
                                                          
7 Details can be read from William Bridges three –stage model in which the emotional process of transition is well 
described. It is the emotional process people go through as a result of a change. The process includes ending, 




Most often the organisations are themselves not ready for these changes that they go through. It 
has been one of the reasons if not the main reason for the demise of many organisations after the 
departure of their founders and long serving directors. Organisations should generally be 
prepared for changes and succession plans should be taken seriously if the nonprofit sector is to 
survive and thrive. The argument has often been advanced that founders of organisations make a 
lot of sacrifices and investments for their organisation than their followers. That is true most of 
the time. However, while one can appreciate that founders make a lot of intellectual, emotional 
and if you like, material investments in the organisations they have founded, we need to 
understand that the founder is not the only person to be destabilised by a transition. It is the whole 
organisation that goes through the kilning process and so every part of the organisation must be 
readied for the big change. A ready organisation is also able to carry other stakeholders like donors 
and beneficiaries along during a transition. One of the things that starve organisations to death 
after their founders is the fact that CSO funding sources can really be a personalised field. That is 
to say some donors and funding sources are attached to the personalities of founders and long 
serving executive directors and so a failure to plan and involve all stakeholders to appreciate the 
changes will mean a huge fall in revenue and support for the organisation.  
One economic view point worthy of note in strengthening founder transitions is the case of 
compensation. The problem of livelihood or financial insecurity as has been mentioned in this 
study cannot be ignored if we are to have effective leadership transitions. Many founders have 
been irritated by the subject of transitions and succession planning primarily because they have 
not been compensated enough. We cannot lose sight of the fact that organisations start out small 
and in their teething stages, founders tend to earn little as compensation for their time and service 
to the organisation. It therefore becomes difficult for them to plan a befitting retirement because 
in some cases, they only just started earning something meaningful. There should therefore be a 
proper consideration of compensation of founders during a transition if we are to start 
experiencing healthy founder transitions.  
Sociologically also, founders and long serving executive directors should be coached in the best 
way to create a balance between their professional lives and social lives. Most often than not, 
founders and some executive directors become so attached to their organisations and the vision 
they pursue to the neglect of their family relationships and social networks. In the end, only their 
identity as founders or leaders of those organisations gives them social connection. When this 
happens, it becomes very difficult to accept the realities when they finally dawn on this individual 
that he/she must stand somewhat detached from the only social environment he/ she has. It is 




prepare for their transition and the sociology of it cannot in any way be ignored. Founders should 
be taught to have a life beyond their organisations. 
Also, as emphasised in the church’s example presented above, there should be a conscious attempt 
at making the best hire of a successor. How prepared a successor is could determine whether the 
organisation will be sustainable or not. In this respect, post hire executive coaching is a good 
initiative that must be utilised. Also, succession plans should include efforts at introducing new 
executive directors to their peers for some peer mentoring and networking in their new career.  
In a nutshell, getting the nonprofit sector to thrive should be approached collectively and 
dispassionately. All the above recommendations may not lead to the success of the sector if we do 
not have vision carriers and people with passion on the boards of nonprofits. While this is not in 
doubt, what the sector in Ghana needs is a proper balance of passion with professionalism. An 
organisation is as good as its board but as it is now, what we have in Ghana is an organisation that 
is as good as its executive director. This is not good. It is not sustainable and therefore there is the 
need to approach this problem head-on. And mind you, this effort at solving the problems of civil 























6.1 CONCLUSIONS  
CSOs in developing democracies may be restricted in their activities and the impact they make 
due to a host of challenges. These challenges include a lack of popular support for CSOs’ place in 
society, organisational inefficiencies, apathy, lack of access to funding and in some cases 
government hostility or opposition. This has led many to question the sustainability of civil society 
in West Africa. I believe that the twin concept of governance and leadership has an overarching 
impact on CSOs sustainability which is what this study has sought contribute to understanding.  
Indeed, it can be said without any equivocation that many civil society organisations in this study 
do not reflect the democratic principles of the present society which we all so heartily celebrate. 
Some of the leaders of these organisations have a belief that the nonprofit sector is special and 
therefore should be left to run in a way parallel to other organisations. However, the lack of 
adherence to proper democratic principles of participation in organisations creates challenges 
many of which have been observed in the present state of CSO governance structures and board 
leadership. There is obviously a sort of managerial hegemony in many of the organisations. The 
situation gives too much power to the executive and also creates a situation where drawing the 
lines between management and governance roles becomes difficult. The hegemonic situation 
created by the ineffectiveness of governing boards witnessed in this study deserves attention from 
researchers and practitioners alike.  
In the true sense of governance, you cannot have the same officers playing the role of the executive 
and the board or council. However, this appears to be the reality in some organisations according 
to the findings in this study. Sequel to this challenge, a majority of CSOs demonstrate a lack of 
preparedness for leadership transitions in all sizes of organisations –big, small and those in 
between as the findings prove.  To deal with this challenge, all organisational actors especially 
founders and boards should recognise that transitions are facts of organisational life and must 
therefore be seen and approached as part of the normal developments an organisation goes 
through. While admitting that founders are special in their commitment to the success of 
organisations they found, it must be accepted and appreciated that one man’s effort is never going 
to be enough in ensuring the sustainability of any organisation let alone a nonprofit one.  
The study has unravelled pertinent issues regarding governance practices in civil society 
organisations and drawn attention to the importance of good governance practices for CSO 
sustainability. The proffered measures could help strengthen the ability of CSOs to monitor the 
allocation of internal and external resources for a thriving third sector. They encourage inclusivity 
and balanced decision making within CSOs. The discussion is therefore hoped to arouse a proper 




‘founder’s syndrome’ and its associated devilry in the nonprofit sector. It is also expected to serve 
as a baseline for a much broader study on CSO governance, accountability systems and leadership 
transitions. It is the hope of the researcher that the report will serve as a good resource to 
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